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Since the passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or "Superfund")' in 1980,
an ever-increasing number of bankruptcy filings raise environmental
issues. Much has been written, both by the courts and commentators, as
to the scope and treatment of environmental liabilities in bankruptcy.2
* Senior Counsel, Environmental Enforcement Section, United States Department of
Justice.
In his capacity as Senior Counsel, Mr. Mounsey has had responsibility for a
number of bankruptcy actions in which the Enforcement Section has been involved.
The views expressed in this Article do not necessarily represent the official views of
the Department of Justice or of the United States.
I. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
2. See, e.g., Joel M. Gross & Suzanne Lacampagne, Bankruptcy Estimation of
CERCLA Claims: The Process and the Alternatives, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 235 (1993);
Morris G. Shanker, A Bankruptcy Superfund for Some Super Creditors, 61 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 185 (1987); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes In
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Similarly, the law of insurance with respect to environmental liabilities
has expanded rapidly as companies and their insurers square-off over
ultimate responsibility for liabilities that can easily reach millions of
dollars. 3
This Article deals with the convergence of these areas of the law.
In particular, it explores the situation in which a bankrupt company with
significant environmental liabilities has insurance policies that may cover
some or all of those liabilities. The Article focuses on the situation from
the perspective of an environmental creditor, whether governmental or
private, that incurs cleanup costs in connection with a contaminated
facility and then is forced to choose between having a debtor's limited
assets go towards partial, though relatively certain, reimbursement of
cleanup costs, or using the assets to pay for the pursuit of an uncertain,
though possibly greater, insurance recovery. The insurance direct
action4 is discussed as a possible solution to this dilemma.
At the time of this writing, Congress was gearing up for hearings
to consider the second reauthorization of CERCLA. 5  In the
reauthorization debate, the insurance industry will likely be one of the
most vocal and most critical voices.6 One likely criticism relates to the
so-called high "transaction costs" associated with Superfund cases, that
is, the costs associated with litigating and defending Superfund cases
Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1199 (1984).
3. A number of insurance cases are cited throughout this Article. For further
discussion on some of the issues that arise in pollution coverage litigation, see Nancer
Ballard & Peter M. Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the Comprehensive
General Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 610 (1990).
4. The term "direct action," as used in this Article, refers to a statutorily-authorized
action against an insurer by one injured by an insured. A direct action also might be
an action brought by the injured party against the insured through an assignment of the
insured's rights under its policy. A discussion of issues that can arise through an
assignment of a liability policy is beyond the scope of this article. For a good general
discussion of these issues, see Xebec Dev. Partners, Ltd. v. National Union Fire Ins.
Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 24 726 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
5. The first reauthorization of CERCLA took place in 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III
1991)). The next reauthorization of CERCLA will occur in 1994.
6. See Jerry Geisel Washington, Superfund Needs Repair Coalition Says, BUS. INS.,
Apr. 12, 1993, at 2.
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versus the amount of money actually spent on cleanup.7 It is not the
purpose of this Article to enter that debate. Nevertheless, it is at least
worth noting that the, direct action, in cases of insolvency, may provide
one method of reducing transaction costs by simply reducing the number
of lawsuits that are filed in connection with a particular facility.
Section I describes the dilemma faced by entities with CERCLA
claims against an insolvent but insured debtor' through the use of a
hypothetical CERCLA-bankruptcy-insurance case. A hypothetical is
necessary because to date only one reported decision exists in which a
creditor has attempted to pursue an insurer directly under CERCLA's
direct action provision.9 Section II describes CERCLA's direct action
provision and its current scope. Section III discusses the constitutionality
of clarifying CERCLA's direct action provision to specify that the direct
action provision can be utilized to pursue insurance policies that pre-
dated CERCLA's enactment. Section IV outlines some important issues
that any entity contemplating an insurance direct action may wish to
consider.
I. THE HYPOTHETICAL INSURED BANKRUPT
Mirage Plating, Inc., has operated a plating plant for many years.
Until the passage of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act("RCRA") 0 in 1976, Mirage disposed of its plating wastewater by
simply pumping it onto the ground outside of its plant. Following the
passage of RCRA, however, Mirage began transporting its wastewater to
a RCRA-permitted facility. Unfortunately for Mirage, however, its
wastewater treatment began a day late and, as Mirage would ultimately
find out, far too many dollars short.
After receiving a complaint from a citizen whose well was
contaminated downgradient of Mirage's plating operation, EPA began an
investigation to determine both the source and the extent of the
7. See, e.g., William H. Hedeman, et al., Superfund Transaction Costs: A Critical
Perspective on the Superfund Liability Scheme, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,413 (July 1991).
8. In this article, "debtor" and "potentially responsible party" ("PRP") are used
interchangeably.
9. See Port Allen Marine Services v. Chotin, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 887 (M.D. La. 1991).
10. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2796 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
6901-6991 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991)). RCRA is a regulatory statute that tracks solid
and hazardous wastes from "cradle to grave."
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contamination. An information request from EPA" to Mirage led to an
on-site investigation of Mirage's property and the discovery of the
plating wastewater pit. Thereafter, Mirage's facility received the dubious
distinction of being placed on EPA's National Priorities List ("NPL"),
EPA's list of the most seriously contaminated facilities in the country.'
2
Through a "special notice"' 3 procedure under CERCLA, EPA requested
that Mirage conduct the cleanup, a pump and treat remedy that EPA
projected would cost several million dollars. Mirage transmitted the
special notice letter to its insurers, who nevertheless declined to provide
either a defense or coverage for the EPA claim,
4 citing a variety of
exclusions in their policies insuring Mirage. 5
When Mirage notified EPA that it would not perform the cleanup,
EPA issued an administrative order against it, 6 and when Mirage failed
to comply with the administrative order, the United States commenced
an injunctive action against Mirage pursuant to section 106 of
II. Section 104(e) of CERCLA authorizes EPA to request various types of
information, including information concerning a person's ability to pay. 42 U.S.C. §
9604(e).
12. CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605. EPA considers facilities for addition to the
NPL according to a hazard ranking system. Once a facility is listed on the NPL, EPA's
"remedial," as opposed to "removal," authorities are triggered. See id. § 101(23), (24),
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23), (24). This triggering of remedial authority usually means that
a remedial investigation and feasibility study ("RI/FS") will be performed to determine
the nature and extent of the contamination. Id. § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604. When the
RI/FS is completed, EPA must select the cost-effective remedy that assures protection
of human health and the environment. Id. 121(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(a).
13. "Special notice" refers to a statutory procedure which gives PRPs an opportunity
to conduct a cleanup. Id. § 122(e), 42 U.S.C. 9622(e). If a PRP provides a good faith
offer to perform the cleanup, the PRP enjoys a moratorium from facing a federal
lawsuit for a 120-day period during which the PRP and the government attempt to
reach a settlement. Id § 122(e)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(2)(A).
14. Typically, upon notification of a potential claim under a standard liability policy,
an insurer has three options. The insurer can seek a declaratory judgment regarding its
duty to defend, either before or during an underlying action against its insured. The
second option is to defend its insured while reserving its rights against its insured.
Finally, the insurer can do neither and face the peril of having any judgment entered
against its insured collaterally estop it from litigating either the merits of the underlying
claim or coverage under its policy. See LaSalle Nat'l Trust, N.A. v. Schaffner, 818 F.
Supp. 1161, 1167 (N.D. I1. 1993).
15. See discussion infra Section IV.
16. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9696(a).
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CERCLA. 7  Mirage's insurers still refused to provide a defense.
Finding its options limited, Mirage filed for relief under the Bankruptcy
Code. 8
To present the issue from a private party's perspective, the
hypothetical case needs to be modified only slightly. Rather than owning
the land on which its facility operates, Mirage leases the facility but
otherwise conducts its business as described above. In the leasing
situation, however, the. lessor receives the citizen's complaint. After
meeting with Mirage and investigating the wastewater pit, the lessor
contacts EPA and agrees to pay for and perform a cleanup action.
For an entity that incurs cleanup costs in connection with a
facility like the one operated by Mirage, this situation can present a real
dilemma. As with the Mirage case, assets in a bankruptcy estate are
often insufficient to pay for a cleanup, even in cases where the cleanup
obligation is treated as an administrative, or priority, expense of the
debtor's estate. 9 On the other hand, if the coverage provided by a
comprehensive general liability policy could be tapped directly,'0 a
"win-win" situation could occur: the entity that paid for the cleanup
could be reimbursed its costs, and the debtor might be able to reorganize,
no longer saddled with the environmental liability.
The rub is that pursuing insurance coverage costs money, and
every dollar paid in pursuit of coverage from a bankrupt debtor is a
dollar potentially taken away from a cleanup. Thus, unless the parties in
interest agree that the debtor's limited assets should be used to pursue an
insurance coverage claim, the assets will be paid to the debtor's creditors
according to the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme,"' instead of being
used to pursue an uncertain insurance recovery. On the other hand, if the
entity that incurred the cleanup costs could directly pursue the debtor's
insurer, the dilemma could be lessened, if not avoided, because the entity
with CERCLA claims could undertake the coverage action on its own
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9606.
18. See II U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
19. Many courts have now held that post-petition CERCLA cleanup costs incurred
with respect to property of the estate should be paid as administrative expenses. See,
e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing similar cases). The
Bankruptcy Code defines administrative expenses as the "actual, necessary costs of
preserving the estate." I I U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(1)(A), 507(a)(1).
20. See Ballard & Manus, supra note 3 (discussing insurance coverage in the context
of environmental claims).
21. See I U.S.C. § 507.
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behalf.
II. CERCLA's DIRECT ACTION PROVISION
Since CERCLA was originally passed in 1980, it has included a
provision, section 108(c)(2),22 that allows certain entities, including the
government, to proceed directly against persons who provide evidence
of financial responsibility for a facility. 23 The two devices that trigger
the financial assurances provided pursuant to section 108 are "a release
or threatened release"24 from the "facility," presumably of a "hazardous
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(c)(2). This section provides:
In the case of a release or threatened release from a facility,
any claim authorized by section 9607 or 9611 of this title may be
asserted directly against any guarantor providing evidence of financial
responsibility for such facility under subsection (b) of this section, if
the person liable under section 9607 of this title is in bankruptcy,
reorganization, or arrangement pursuant to the Federal Bankruptcy
Code, or if, with reasonable diligence, jurisdiction in the Federal
courts cannot be obtained over a person liable under section 9607 of
this title who is likely to be solvent at the time of judgment. In the
case of any action pursuant to this paragraph, the guarantor shall be
entitled to invoke all rights and defenses which would have been
available to the person liable under section 9607 of this title if any
action had been brought against such person by the claimant and all
rights and defenses which would have been available to the guarantor
if an action had been brought against the guarantor by such person.
Id.
23. Section 108(c)(1) authorizes direct actions by the government against guarantors
of financial responsibility for "vessels." See id. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(c)(1). Section
108(c)(2) authorizes direct actions by the government against guarantors of financial
responsibility for "facilities." See id. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(c)(2). The two provisions are
substantially the same, except that the defenses available to guarantors of financial
responsibility for vessels are more limited than the defenses available to guarantors of
financial responsibility for "facilities." See id. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(b), 9608(a)-(c).
"Facility" is a broadly-defined term under CERCLA that essentially
encompasses every place where a hazardous substance has been stored, deposited,
placed, disposed of, or has otherwise come to be located. See id. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
24. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(c)(2). The original § 108(c) did not contain the "release or
threatened release language":
Any claim authorized by section 9607 or 9611 of this title
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substance,"25 and the insolvency of the person who is liable for the
release under section 107(a) of CERCLA.2 6  The insolvency
may be asserted directly against any guarantor providing evidence of
financial responsibility as required under this section. In defending
such a claim, the guarantor may invoke all rights and defenses which
would be available to the owner or operator under this subchapter.
The guarantor may also invoke the defense that the incident was
caused by the willful misconduct of the owner or operator, but such
guarantor may not invoke any other defense that such guarantor might
have been entitled to invoke in a proceeding brought by the owner or
operator against him.
Id § 9608(c) (1980).
25. Although § 108(c)(2) does not refer to a release of a "hazardous substance," the
general liability provision of CERCLA, § 107(a), to which § 108(c)(2) refers, does. 42
U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9608(c)(2); see infra note 26 (reciting text of § 107(a)). The term
"hazardous substance" includes within its definition, among other things, hazardous
substances under CERCLA (CERCLA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 9602) and substances treated
as hazardous waste under RCRA (RCRA § 3001, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1988 & Supp. III
1991)). CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Section 107(a) provides in parts relevant to this Article:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and
subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section -
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous
substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
aranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or
possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility
or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity
and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration
vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release
which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance, shall be liable for--
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not
inconsistent with the national contingency plan; [and]
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency plan ....
1993]
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requirement derives from the language in section 108(c)(2), which states
that a party must be "in bankruptcy, reorganization, or arrangement
pursuant to the Federal Bankruptcy Code, or ... with reasonable diligence,
jurisdiction in the Federal courts cannot be obtained over a person liable
under section 9607 of title who is likely to be solvent at the time of
judgment."21
CERCLA refers to persons who provide evidence of financial
responsibility as "guarantors. ''2 1 "Guarantor" is defined in CERCLA as
"any person, other than the owner or operator, who provides evidence of
financial responsibility for an owner or operator under this 
chapter."' 29
Until the passage of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986 ("SARA"),3" Congress did not clarify further the application of
section 108 as to the persons included within the definition of
"guarantor" with respect to facilities. In SARA, however, Congress
amended section 108(b)(2) of CERCLA to provide that "[flinancial
responsibility may be established by ... insurance, guarantee, surety bond,
... or qualification as a self-insurer."'" Based upon this straight-forward
reading of section 108, the definition of "guarantor" would appear to
include insurers. The one court to have considered the liability of
guarantors under section 108(c), however, held otherwise.
32
A. Port Allen Marine Services, Inc. v. Chotin
Port Allen Marine Services, Inc. v. Chotin" involved a
contribution action brought by Chotin and Port Allen Marine against
Chotin's insurer under CERCLA and various Louisiana state law
theories. In granting the insurer's motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, the court relied on the fact that the list of persons liable under
id.
27. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(c)(2).
28. Id. § 9601(13).
29. Id.
30. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1672 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 1991)).
31. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
9608(b) (1988)). Section 108(a) of CERCLA, which is the provision that enables EPA
to promulgate financial assurance requirements for vessels, includes identical language.
42 U.S.C. § 9608(a)(1).
32. Port Allen Marine Services, Inc. v. Chotin, 765 F. Supp. 887 (M.D. La. 1991).
33. Port Allen Marine, .765 F. Supp. 887.
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section 107(a) of CERCLA did not include "insurers."34 This reasoning
is flawed, however, because it ignores the fact that section 108(c) of
CERCLA specifically allows for direct actions against guarantors, which
could, as stated, include insurers.3 Congress simply dealt with the
liability of insurers through a section of CERCLA different from the
general liability provision. Perhaps recognizing this flaw in its reasoning,
the court in Port Allen Marine then added in a footnote another reason
for not allowing the direct action to go forward: "Section 9608(c) does
allow a direct right of action against guarantors, but only for third party
claims under §§ 9607 or 9611 rather than for claims for contribution."36
This somewhat oblique statement by the court was apparently a
reference to the fact that CERCLA has two types of cost recovery
actions, the direct action under section 107(a)" and the contribution
action under section 113(o.3' Although one may reason that section
108(c), by its terms, only refers to claims "authorized by section 9607 or
9611 of this title"39  and that CERCLA technically authorizes
contribution in section 113(f),40 this reasoning says nothing about
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). "To read [section 107(a) to include insurers] would
require the Court to ignore and disregard the clear language of § 9607(a). [footnote
omitted] If insurers are to be sued directly under § 9607(a), the Congress, and not this
Court, must amend the § 9607(a) to provide this right." Port Allen Marine, 765 F.
Supp. at 889.
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 9608(c)(l)-(2). The legislative history to § 108 resolves any
doubt about this interpretation:
Guarantor is the third major class subject to liability under the Act.
It is a generic term that describes any person, except an owner or
operator, who provides the evidence of financial responsibility
required under section 105 [section 108 of CERCLA]. The term
includes any person providing insurance, guarantees, or surety bonds
for liability imposed on an owner or operator under the Act.
H.R. REP. No. 1016, Pt. 2, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1980) reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6151, 6182.
36. Port Allen Marine, 765 F. Supp. at 889 n.4.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4)(A) & (B).
38. Id. § 9613(0.
39. Id. § 9608(c).
40. The word "technically" is used because § 113(0, the contribution provision, refers
back to § 107(a) in authorizing a contribution action: "Any person may seek
contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section
9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action under section 9606 of this title
1993]
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whether the term "guarantor" as it is used in section 108(c)(2)
encompasses insurers.4 On the contrary, the plain language of section
108 indicates that Congress envisioned insurers as potential guarantors.
Although Congress may have envisioned insurer liability under
section 108(c), any entity that incurs response costs may not necessarily
sue an insurer if its insured is liable under section 107(a) of CERCLA
and is insolvent.42 Section 108(c)(2) provides that the insurer must
have provided insurance as evidence of financial responsibility "under
subsection (b)."43 Subsection (b) of section 108 authorizes and indeed
or under section 9607(a) of this title." Id. § 9613(0. Thus, although § 108(c) is
technically dependent upon a claim, and thus a liability, arising under § 107(a), one
must note that so too is § 113(0. Distinguishing the two types of action does not seem
logical when one examines § 108(c), which is premised on providing a mechanism for
a person to recover its response costs from the insurer of an insolvent PRP.
The word "technically" also is used because some debate exists as to whether
§ 107(e)(2) of CERCLA implicitly authorizes a contribution action, as some courts held
prior to the passage of SARA. See United States v. Miami Drum Services, Inc., 25
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1469, 1475 (S.D. Fla. 1986); United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 807 n.3 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
41. The court in Port Allen Marine implicitly recognized this flaw in its own
reasoning:
Section 9608(c), as amended in 1986 [citation omitted], provides for
direct actions against guarantors in limited circumstances. There are
no exceptions set forth in the statute which permit direct action
against insurers. An insurer is not necessarily a guarantor. Therefore,
considering the clear meaning of the statute, the Court can logically
conclude that Congress only intended to allow direct actions in cases
involving guarantors. As noted earlier, it is for the Congress and not
this Court to provide for direct actions against an insurer where the
statute has a clear and unambiguous meaning.
Port Allen Marine, 765 F. Supp. at 889-90 (citation omitted) (emphasis altered). As
stated in the text, an insurer is not necessarily a guarantor, but an insurer could be. By
not discussing CERCLA's definition of guarantor, as clarified by § 108(b)'s express
reference to "insurers," the court in effect retreated from its prior determination that
"insurer" was not one of the listed liable parties under § 107(a).
42. The "insolvency" requirement was added by the 1986 amendments to CERCLA.
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
9608(c)(2) (1988)).
43. The House Report supports this interpretation:
[S]ection [108] makes explicit and uniform how evidence of financial
responsibility is to be provided. First, the section requires that
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obligates EPA" to promulgate financial responsibility regulations within
five years after the passage of CERCLA for facilities "consistent with the
degree and duration of risk associated with the production, transportation,
treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous substances."45 EPA did not
promulgate these regulations within the specified period, nor has it done
so since the deadline passed.46 Because the subsection (b) requirements
evidence of financial responsibility is to be provided in accordance
with regulations promulgated by the Administrator of EPA. Thus, for
example, the mere purchase of insurance by an owner or operator is
not sufficient, in and of itself, to meet the financial responsibility
provisions of CERCLA. Rather, in order to meet the requirements of
the statute, an owner or operator must obtain from a guarantor
insurance or some other form offinancial guarantee that qualifies as
evidence offinancial responsibility pursuant to EPA's regulations.
H.R. REP. No. 253, Pt. 4, 99 Cong. 2d Sess. 76 (1986) (emphasis added).
44. CERCLA actually grants the authority to promulgate the financial responsibility
requirements to the President, who has in turn delegated that authority to the
Administrator of EPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b).
45. CERCLA § 108(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b)(1). EPA "[tio the maximum extent
practicable ... [must] cooperate with and seek the advice of the commercial insurance
industry in developing financial responsibility requirements." Id. § 108(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9608(b)(2). Although Congress expected that the financial responsibility requirements
ultimately imposed by the regulations would be imposed "incrementally, ... in no event
[were they to be imposed] more than 4 years after the date of promulgation." Id §
108(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b)(3). EPA never promulgated the financial assurance
regulations.
46. Although it is clear from the legislative history of § 108 of CERCLA that
Congress intended EPA to promulgate financial assurance requirements for CERCLA
facilities, it is not exactly clear why. If the intent was to ensure that funds would be
available to respond to "existing" CERCLA facilities (apart from the financial condition
or availability of the PRP), then § 108 of CERCLA would not appear to have much
utility. This is because CERCLA facilities are not "tracked" by EPA unless there has
been a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at the facility. See
CERCLA §§ 104, 105, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9605. If there has been a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance, then insurance would not be available,
because the event to be insured against would already have occurred, see infra note 51,
and it simply would be a matter of determining what amount of money is sufficient to
assure that the work will be completed, which is an issue that is already being
addressed by EPA through the model consent decree financial assurance requirements.
On the other hand, if the intent was to ensure that funds are available for the cleanup
of facilities where there has not been a release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance, then it is likely that many of these facilities would already be subject to
RCRA's financial assurance provision. See 40 C.F.R. § 264.143(f) (1992).
1993]
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have never been promulgated, one may question whether suit could be
brought directly against any entity that provides evidence of financial
responsibility for a CERCLA facility based solely on section 108(c) of
CERCLA.47
B. Present Financial Responsibility Requirements Under CERCLA
For the reasons discussed above, Congress appears to have drafted
section 108 of CERCLA for prospective application only, for the case in
which a guarantor provides financial assurances in conformance with
regulations promulgated by EPA. EPA has not addressed, however, the
subject of financial assurances for CERCLA facilities, except in the
context of settlements and primarily with respect to settlements
authorized by section 122 of CERCLA.4" The basis for these section
122 settlements, also known as remedial design/remedial action
(RD/RA")49 settlements, is EPA's model consent decree.So
Under the model consent decree, a settling PRP must provide
financial assurances as part of the settlement, although EPA's regional
offices generally determine the amount of financial assurances that must
be provided for a specific facility."' Settling PRPs, however, have the
ability to provide financial assurances through a variety of mechanisms,
including performance bonds, letters of credit, and compliance with
RCRA's financial assurance requirements. These mechanisms are
essentially the same financial assurance mechanisms authorized by
Recognition of either of these points would perhaps explain why the financial assurance
requirements have not yet been promulgated.
47. The court in Port Allen Marine hinted at this questionable cause of action in a
footnote: "As the plaintiffs concede, the government has not passed the regulations
necessary to put § 9608 into effect." Port Allen Marine, 765 F. Supp. at 889 n.4.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 9622.
49. See CERCLA § 122(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a). The RD/RA settlements give EPA
the discretion to enter into agreements with any PRP to facilitate response action
performance. The settlement option "expedite[s] effective remedial actions and
minimize[s] litigation." Id.
50. 56 Fed. Reg. 30,996 (1991). The model consent decree must be used in any
RD/RA negotiation that post-dates the model's publication in the federal register by
sixty days. Id at 30,997. The model itself, however, is not a "rule," so that EPA may
modify its terms depending on the needs of a particular case. Id. at 30,996.
51. The financial assurances provision of the model is not one of the ten provisions
of "national significance," meaning that EPA regional offices can modify the provision
without EPA headquarters approval. Id.
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section 108 of CERCLA, with one important exception -- insurance is
not listed as one of the acceptable financial assurance mechanisms.52
EPA's model consent decree financial assurance requirements thus
appear to be a sort of surrogate for section 108's financial assurance
requirements, at least for facilities where a settlement is in place.
Because EPA did not adopt the model consent decree as a formal rule,
however, the model consent decree probably would not provide the
mechanism necessary to trigger the direct action provisions of section
108(c). Consequently, unless and until EPA formally enacts regulations
to codify financial assurance requirements for CERCLA facilities, any
direct action against a "guarantor" premised solely on section 108(c)
probably will not succeed.53
This conclusion is further supported by section 108(b)(2) of
CERCLA, which authorizes EPA "to specify policy or other contractual
terms, conditions, or defenses which are necessary, or which are
unacceptable, in establishing such evidence of financial responsibility in
order to effectuate the purposes of [CERCLA]."54 These terms, when
specified, should effectively become part of any policy of insurance
provided as evidence of financial responsibility, 5 whether or not they
are actually written into the policy."' Until these terms are specified,
52. See id at 31,004. The omission of insurance is not as surprising as it might seem
at first, when one considers that insurance is a "wager against the occurrence of a
specified event." Bartholomew v. Appalachian Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 27, 29 (1st Cir.
1981). As the court stated in Bartholomew, EPA requiring insurance as a financial
assurance mechanism for a CERCLA facility which is the subject of a settlement to
perform a cleanup is similar to a homeowner attempting to insure his "house against
flood damage when the rising waters were already in his front yard." Id.
53. This reasoning does not necessarily preclude an action against a person, such as
a guarantor, who provided evidence of financial assurances in connection with an
RD/RA consent decree. Rather, the argument suggests that such an action would
necessarily have to be based on the guarantee itself, as opposed to the direct action
provision.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b)(2).
55. This language was added to § 108 in the 1986 Superfund Amendments specifically
to address the possibility that "a guarantor might use its policy terms and conditions to
diminish the risk it was undertaking, and therefore the value of the financial
responsibility it had provided." H.R. REP No. 99-253(1), 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt 1,
at 75-76 (1985).
56. Cf Shockley v. Sallows, 615 F.2d 233, 237 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom.
Colonial Penn. Ins. Co. v. Shockley, 449 U.S. 838 (1980) (applying provisions of state
financial responsibility law to liability policy, where policy stated that it had been
issued in compliance with financial responsibility law). Accord Continental Casualty
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however, it is difficult to envision a direct action case based upon an
insurance policy that is supposed to incorporate them, unless such
policies specifically state that they comply with any applicable financial
responsibility laws and provide substantially the same coverage required
by such laws." In any event, there are several reasons why the
likelihood of a direct CERCLA action based upon section 108 as it is
currently drafted may be largely academic, at least for the foreseeable
future.
Not long after the passage of CERCLA, insurance companies
began writing "absolute" pollution exclusion policies.5" Unlike their
predecessors, which did not exclude pollution at all or covered pollution
as long as it was due to a sudden and accidental event, 9 these new
policies have pollution exclusion provisions that purport to exclude
pollution absolutely.' In order for insurance to have any substantive
vitality as a financial responsibility mechanism under section 108, two
events therefore would have to occur. First, EPA and the insurance
industry would probably have to convene a virtual financial assurance
"summit" because section 108(b) of CERCLA requires that EPA, prior
to promulgating the regulations and "to the maximum extent practicable,"
"cooperate with and seek the advice of the commercial insurance industry
in developing [these new] financial responsibility requirements." '61
Second, unless the insurance industry also supported the new financial
assurance requirements for insurance policies proposed by EPA, EPA
would have to exercise its authority under section 108(b) to override the
absolute pollution exclusion provisions that are now in vogue, which the
insurance industry would likely oppose.62  In light of these
Co. v. Phoenix Construction Co., 296 P.2d 801 (Cal. 1956)
57. See Shockley, 615 F.2d at 233; Continental Casualty Co., 296 P.2d at 801.
58. See James T. Hendrick & James P. Wiezel, The New Commercial General Liability
Forms -- An Introduction and Critique, 36 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 319, 346-47
(1986); cf United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 204 (W.D.
Mo. 1986) (agreeing that if a policy contains a "total pollution exclusion" clause,
coverage for pollution should be excluded under policy).
59. Conservation Chemical Co., 653 F. Supp. at 201.
60. See also Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of
Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 942, 958-59 (1988).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b)(2).
62. Id Congress in fact expressed concern in this regard in connection with the 1986
amendments to § 108: "At the time of enactment of CERCLA, there was some concern
that a guarantor might use its policy terms and conditions to diminish the risk it was
undertaking, and therefore the value of the financial assurance responsibility it had
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contingencies, it seems fair to say that, at a minimum the section 108
financial responsibility requirements will not likely become effective
soon.
If liability insurance is not likely to be a significant financial
assurance mechanism in the near future, one wonders whether Congress
should apply CERCLA's direct action provision to insurance policies in
existence before 1980.
III. THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF CERCLA's DIRECT ACTION
PROVISION
CERCLA's direct action provision, like the automobile direct
action provisions upon which it likely was based,63 is a provision that
was designed to address a particular evil, namely the insolvency of a
person who is liable for the release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance from a facility." To this end, Congress authorized a direct
provided. The section authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency to specify
policy or other contractual terms, conditions or defenses which EPA deems to be
necessary or to be unacceptable in establishing evidence of financial responsibility."
H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I at 75-76 (1986).
63. The purpose of direct action provisions generally is to secure to travelers and to
injured persons a beneficial interest in the proceeds of an insurance policy. Where the
direct action provision is conditioned on the insolvency of the insured, the narrower
purpose is to protect the injured person from the insolvency of the insured. COUCH ON
INSURANCE 2D § 45:798, at 454 (Rev. ed. 1981).
64. The House Report in connection with the 1986 amendments to § 108 described the
purpose of the direct action provision:
Absent the right of direct action, an injured party would file an action
only against the person who allegedly had caused the injury, and it is
that person's liability which is litigated in the action. The insurer's
obligation is to its insured, with whom the insurer has a contract. If
the insured is found liable, then the insurer is obligated to make
payment to the insured in accordance with and subject to the terms of
the contract.
In some instances, however, an injured party, who is the
intended beneficiary of the financial responsibility requirements in
CERCLA, may not be able to bring an action against the owner or
operator to recover from that owner or operator or their guarantor.
There are two circumstances where this may occur. First, it is
possible that a claimant may not be able to obtain court jurisdiction
over the owner or operator either voluntarily or involuntarily may be
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action against the insolvent PRP's guarantor, and it defined guarantor to
include persons who provide evidence of financial responsibility,
including insurers, according to regulations promulgated by EPA. By
limiting the reach of the direct action statute to policies issued either
subsequent to CERCLA's enactment or in conformance with regulations
not yet promulgated by EPA, however, Congress severely circumscribed
the universe of potential direct action cases. In light of this limitation,
one wonders whether section 108 could have been drafted to apply
retroactively to insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of
CERCLA.
As a general rule, legislation "is not unlawful solely because it
upsets otherwise settled expectations," even if it imposes "a new duty or
liability based on past acts."'65 Due process is satisfied "simply by
showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified
by a rational legislative purpose."" Thus, the level of judicial scrutiny
for retroactive and prospective legislation is the same -- whether there is
a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose.6 Courts may
hesitate, however, to approve a statute that imposes liability retroactively
on any theory of deterrence or blameworthiness.6" As discussed further
below in connection with a discussion of state direct action statutes, little
doubt exists that CERCLA's direct action provision would not satisfy a
in bankruptcy. These two circumstances include cases where an
owner or operator may be identified and subject to court jurisdiction,
but clearly unlikely to be solvent (i.e., capable of paying the
judgment) at the time the litigation is resolved. The section would
afford a claimant the right of direct action in both instances.
H.R. Rep. 253, Pt. 4, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 51-52 (1986).
65. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16 (1976), superseded by statute
as stated in, Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Office of Workers' Compensation
Program, 999 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1993).
66. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984),
superseded by statute as stated in, Orrego v. 833 West Buena Joint Venture, 943 F.2d
730 (7th Cir. 1991).
67. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). In Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. the United States Supreme Court reiterated that Turner Elkhorn provides the
analysis for resolving constitutional challenges to retroactive civil legislation. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 467 U.S. at 728-730. "Provided that the retroactive application
of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means,
judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive province
of the legislative and executive branches." Id. at 729.
68. Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 17-18.
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constitutional challenge measured against this yardstick, even if it
expressly operated retroactively.
Direct action statutes, until recently, were primarily a creature of
state legislatures. As a result, the constitutional law relating to direct
action statutes has developed under the Contracts Clause, which applies
to the states but not to the federal government.69 Nevertheless, the
Contracts Clause body of law is useful from the perspective of
understanding the nature and operation of direct action statutes generally,
as well as arguments that likely would be advanced if CERCLA's direct
action provision were to be amended expressly to have retroactive
application.
As a general rule, legislation that is "remedial" in nature can
constitutionally be applied retroactively.70 Broad agreement exists that
direct action statutes are remedial in nature because they facilitate the
recovery by an injured person without the necessity of first having to
pursue the tortfeasor.7' Courts agree that CERCLA is remedial in
nature, and that CERCLA's liability scheme is not unconstitutional
69. "No State shall ... pass any ... law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S.
Const. Art. I, § 10 (emphasis added). Some debate has occurred as to whether the
Contracts Clause operates against the federal government through the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The debate centers around the meaning to be given
to the Supreme Court's decision in Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934), in
which the Court stated that "[r]ights against the United States arising out of a contract
with it are protected by the Fifth Amendment." Id at 579. Decisions issued both
before and after Lynch, however, have emphasized that the Fifth Amendment's
protections are stated in terms of property interests against the federal government, and
that Congress has always had broader authority under its commerce power to impair
contracts between private parties. See Larionoff v. United States, 431 F.2d 1167, 1179-
80 (D.C. Cir. 1976), af'd, 431 U.S. 864 (1977); see also Thorpe v. Housing Authority,
393 U.S. 268, 279 n.33 (1969); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S.
467, 482 (1911); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Witthuhn, 596 F.2d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 1979)
("the Supreme Court has never held the Contract Clause applicable to federal as
opposed to state action"); S & M Paving, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust
of Southern California, 539 F. Supp. 867, 869 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
70. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 2.11, at
47 (4th ed. 1991); COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D, supra note 63, at 455 (and cases cited
therein); see also Penny v. Powell, 347 S.W.2d 601, 603-04 (Tex. 1961); Hasselstrom
v. Rex Chainbelt, Inc., 184 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Wis. 1971).
71. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 70; COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D, supra note 63;
Penny, 347 S.W.2d at 604; Hasselstrom, 184 N.W.2d at 907.
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because of its possible retroactive application."
Although direct action statutes are remedial in nature, courts
considering their constitutionality typically further inquire as to whether
the direct action provision in question operates "substantively" or
"procedurally."" Where the statute essentially operates as a joinder
provision, similar to Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
courts have had little trouble in labeling the statute "procedural" and in
finding that it does not impair contract obligations.7 4 Where the statute
imposes liability on the insurer as a result of its insured's actions, other
courts have been reluctant to apply the statute retroactively, concluding
that the provision is "substantive."0
Several of the cases that have considered the impairment of
contract issue have done so in the context of the collision that necessarily
occurs between direct action statutes and insurance policies that contain
"no action," or "no joinder," clauses. A "no action" provision typically
requires the injured party to obtain a judgment against the insured prior
to initiating an action against the insurer.76 Although some authority
exists for the proposition that a direct action provision cannot
retroactively nullify the operation of a "no action" clause," the better
72. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d
726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). ("ITlhe language used in
the key liability provision, CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607, refers to actions and
conditions in the past tense," and "[fJurther, the statutory scheme itself is
overwhelmingly remedial and retroactive.") Some courts have even questioned whether
CERCLA is, in fact, retroactive in the constitutional sense because liability is premised
on the present release or threatened release of a hazardous substance, which is the
present or future result of a past action. See, e.g., id, at 733 n.4; United States v.
Miami Drum Services, Inc., 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1469, 1477 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
73. See Shockley v. Shallows, 615 F.2d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1980).
74. Id.
This [direct] right of action has been characterized as procedural for
some purposes and substantive for others. As to impairment of
contract obligations, it is deemed procedural or remedial. It is
substantive in the sense that a federal court in Louisiana will permit
direct actions where jurisdiction is based on diversity.
Id.
75. See Bradford v. Commonwealth Casualty Co., 158 A. 840 (N.J. Misc. 1932).
76. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 9.9(c), at 1096
(West 1988).
77. See Hasselstrom v. Rex Chainbelt, Inc., 184 N.W.2d at 902, 908 (Wis. 1971).
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view is that it can, for at least two reasons.
"No action" clauses were drafted to protect insurance carriers
against excessive jury sympathies for injured plaintiffs, which insurers
feared would occur if the tortfeasor's liability were tried simultaneously
with the coverage issues.7" Insurers also feared possible jury prejudices
against insurers generally. 79  "No action" clauses also have been
justified as necessary to avoid potential confusion between issues relating
to the liability of the insured, which typically involves questions of tort
law, and issues relating to the liability of the insurer, which relate to the
insurer's contract of insurance.80 In the context of a CERCLA action,
however, none of these arguments applies because CERCLA cases are
tried to the court rather than to a jury.' Similarly, because CERCLA
actions are tried to the court, jury confusion should not be an issue.
Second, "no action" provisions are ignored by most federal courts
because they contravene the purposes of the rules of joinder of parties.82
As one court eloquently stated with respect to a direct action provision,
"[t]he Legislature evidently felt that our courts should not be made to
become circumlocution officers winding and unwinding red tape, but felt
that the nearest point to a given object was a straight line."'83 At least
one court has specifically recognized that the very purpose of direct
action provisions is to invalidate "no action" clauses."
Returning to CERCLA's direct action provision with this
background in mind, one can make a number of observations. First,
section 108(c) of CERCLA appears to have been modeled after the direct
action statutes that have been held to be procedural, rather than
substantive, in nature. Section 108 does not impose liability; it merely
grants an entity that has a claim against a guarantor of a PRP under
78. KEEToN & WIDIss, supra note 76, at 1097.
79. Id; see also Bankers Trust Co. v. Republic Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 677, 682 (7th Cir.
1992).
80. KEETON & WiDiss, supra note 76, at 1097-98.
81. See, e.g., Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical, 810 F.2d at 749.
82. See LaSalle Nat'l Trust v. Schaffier, 818 F. Supp. 1166 (N.D. Ill. 1993)(and
citations therein).
83. Home Ins. Co. v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 62 So.2d 828, 831 (La. 1952); see
also Bankers Trust, 959 F.2d at 682 (suggesting that in certain circumstances it may
actually be necessary for a victim of an insured to proceed directly against the insurer
in order to protect the victim's potential recovery under the insured's policy).
84. Symoenides v. Cosmar Compania Naviera, S.A., 494 F. Supp. 240 (M.D. La.
1980).
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section 107 of CERCLA the right to bring an action directly against the
guarantor without first obtaining a judgment against the PRP."5
Section 108(c) also expressly reserves to the guarantor the ability
to assert whatever defenses its insured would have had in an action under
section 107 of CERCLA, as well as whatever defenses it would have in
a coverage action based upon its contract of insurance.86 Moreover, the
1986 Superfund Amendments amended section 108(d)(1) to provide
explicitly that the extent of an insurer's direct liability will not exceed
the limits of the coverage provided in its insurance policy. In this
regard, guarantors occupy an unusual position because generally contracts
allocating responsibility under CERCLA are of no effect insofar as
liability under section 107(e) of CERCLA is concerned."8
Thus, while perhaps upsetting an insurer's expectation that a
judgment first be obtained against its insured, the retroactive application
of CERCLA's direct action provision seems to be a rational way of
avoiding an otherwise unnecessarily circuitous litigation trail involving
an insolvent or otherwise unavailable PRP.89 To use the language of
the Supreme Court's decision in Turner Elkhorn,9" the retroactive
application of CERCLA's direct action provision would be a minor
adjustment of "the burdens and benefits of economic life."9'
85. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(c).
86. Id
87. Id § 9608(d)(1).
88. Id. § 9607(e).
89. But see Abraham, supra note 60, at 949, wherein the author argues that the
combination of retroactive and joint and several liability under CERCLA has created
liabilities that far exceed the risks insurers undertook in drafting insurance policies prior
to CERCLA's enactment. Whether this is true or not, this argument fails to address the
impact of CERCLA liability from the standpoint of the insured, who paid a premium
for insurance based upon a contract drafted by the insurer.
90. Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. 1.
91. Id. at 15. One area in which the impairment of contract rights might occur relates
to EPA's ability to dictate the terms of acceptable financial responsibility. Under §
108(b) of CERCLA, EPA has the authority to draft regulations that specify not only the
financial assurance amount required for a given class of facility, but also the term of
a insurance policy that would be acceptable for financial assurances purposes. If EPA
were to utilize this authority in a way that changed the terms or limits of existing
policies, then section 108(c)'s procedural character would quickly become substantive.
Of course, for the reasons discussed above, it is fairly clear that this rulemaking
authority was expected to be utilized prospectively only.
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IV.. LITIGATING A DIRECT ACTION CASE
Because CERCLA's direct action provision expressly preserves
both underlying liability and coverage defenses to the insurer, the ability
to bring a direct action is only one step towards ultimately prevailing on
a coverage claim. 2 In light of this, a creditor considering direct action
litigation would be well-advised to begin by obtaining the insurance
policies of the insured. In this regard, the government might have an
advantage over a private creditor. Under CERCLA, EPA has the
authority not only to request information relating to a PRP's operations,
but also to request information about its ability to pay for a cleanup.93
EPA routinely requests and obtains from PRPs their insurance policies
pursuant to this authority.
Creditors also should request information concerning the notices
that the insured has or has not given to its insurer concerning its
environmental liabilities. If the response to this request is that policies
are missing or cannot be obtained, the creditor should depose former
managers and officers of the debtor as to their recollection of the
company's prior carriers and the years particular carriers provided
coverage. Discovery then can be directed to the identified insurers in an
effort to obtain copies of the insured's policies or, at a minimum, some
correspondence indicating the existence of prior coverage.94
Once the debtor's insurance policies have been obtained, they
should be read closely to determine the extent to which pollution was or
was not excluded from coverage.9" If pollution were excluded from
92. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
93. Id. § 104(e)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(2)(C).
94. If any indications exist that policies had been issued but they simply cannot be
found, the court possibly would accept the standard policy approved by the state's
insurance board at the time.
95. Whether pollution was excluded from the coverage or not may not be readily
apparent. Although most pollution coverage cases have turned on the definition of
"property damage" and the exclusions associated with that term, some courts recently
have recognized the possibility that pollution may fall within the definition of "personal
injury." See, e.g., Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976
F.2d 1037, 1042 (7th Cir. 1992); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. American Empire Surplus Lines
Ins. Co., 811 F. Supp. 210 (D.Md. 1993). Cf. Clausen v. Aetna Casualty Co., 676 F.
Supp. 1571 (S.D. Ga. 1987)(finding no personal injury coverage). The possibility of
coverage for pollution under the definition of "personal injury" is important because it
may avoid the necessity of overcoming a number of coverage hurdles, including
whether the damage or loss was expected or intended by the insured. See, e.g., Zurich
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coverage during some years but not others, creditors should compare this
information with information relating to the debtor's past operations in
an effort to determine the likelihood of ultimately prevailing under each
policy.96
Creditors should review the policies to determine whether they are
"occurrence" policies or "claims made" policies. An "occurrence" policy
typically requires that "damage" or "loss" have occurred during the
coverage period, whereas a "claims made" policy generally requires that
a claim be asserted while the policy is effective.97 In either case, if the
creditor previously made a demand against the insured, the creditor
should forward a copy of the demand to the insured's insurers.98
Creditors should further review the policies to determine which
jurisdiction's laws apply.99 The law that a court applies can be critical
to the ultimate outcome of a CERCLA insurance case. Applicable law
can determine central issues such as whether response costs are
"damages" under a liability policy; °° whether the pollution was
"sudden and accidental;"'01 and whether the damage was "expected or
intended from the standpoint of the insured."' 2 Assuming a review of
these and other coverage issues indicates that coverage might be
available, the ultimate decision to proceed directly against the insurer
may, in large part, depend on whether the debtor is liquidating or
Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 232 Cal. Rptr. 807 (Ct. App. 1986).
96. In many cases, a creditor will not know the full extent of a PRP's past operations
until it initiates a lawsuit and undertakes extensive discovery.
97. See United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 181-83, 194-97
(W.D. Mo. 1986).
98. Typically, policies require insureds to notify insurers "as soon as practicable," or
words to that effect, of a claim made upon the insured. See Xebec Dev. Partners, Ltd.
v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726, 740-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
99. For a general discussion of choice of law principles, see Conservation Chemical,
653 F. Supp. at 176-78. In this regard, one should note that a federal rule of decision
may be appropriate, at least as to policies that do not contain provisions regarding
applicable law.
100. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir.
1991), amended 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 30068.
101. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 933 F.2d
1162, 1169, 1199-1203 (3d Cir. 1991); Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co.,
811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991).
102. See, e.g., City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146, 1150-
51 (2d Cir. 1989). A detailed discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this
Article. For a discussion of many of these issues, see Conservation Chemical, 653 F.
Supp. at 152.
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reorganizing.
In general, the debtor and the creditors are more likely to support
the debtor's own pursuit of its insurers in a reorganization than in a
liquidation. Such efforts by the debtor might therefore avoid the need
for direct action by a creditor. In a liquidation, on the other hand, a
trustee makes the decision to pursue insurance claims,10 3 and the trustee
may not be as inclined to gamble the estate's limited assets on an
uncertain insurance recovery as the debtor would be in -a
reorganization."°4 In a reorganization, the debtor tends to take a keen
interest in whether coverage claims will be pursued against its insurer,
and, if so, by whom.' For these reasons, the most likely case for a
direct action against an insolvent PRP's insurer would be most likely to
occur when the debtor's assets were being liquidated. °"
103. See II U.S.C. § 701. "Promptly after the order for relief under this chapter, the
United States trustee shall appoint one disinterested person that is a member of the
panel of private trustees ... to serve as interim trustee." Id. (emphasis added).
104. See I I U.S.C. § 704 ("The trustee shall -- (1) collect and reduce to money the
property of the estate for which such trustee serves, and close such estates as
expeditiously as is compatible with the interest of parties in interest ... ").
A governmental entity might be able to force the issue to a certain extent by
simply initiating a cost recovery action against the debtor. In that case, the insurer
would likely have to determine whether to defend its insured. If the insurer did not
provide a defense and the government prevailed in its cost recovery action, then the
insurer should be collaterally estopped from relitigating the insured's liability in the
context of a later action to enforce its judgment against the insurer. See Xebec
Development, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745 (discussing this theory in the context of a spousal
support agreement).
105. Although a CERCLA cost recovery action by a private party would be stayed by
the automatic stay, 1 U.S.C. § 362(a), a similar action by a governmental entity
would not be. 11 U.S.C. § 362(bX4)-(5). See, e.g., United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857
F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, if a governmental entity attempted to proceed
directly against a debtor's insurer in a reorganization, either outside of a confirmed plan
or without obtaining other appropriate court order, the debtor might seek a stay of the
action pursuant to the bankruptcy court's broad powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105, on the
theory that the direct action was affecting property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. §
362(a)(3). The governmental entity could respond by simply adding a debtor as a
defendant in its direct action case. In any event, an environmental claimant probably
would want to examine the debtor's disclosure statement before it considered initiating
a direct action. Such claimant should seek the blessing of the bankruptcy court for this
course of action before undertaking it.
106. An occasion might arise in which a direct action might be appropriate in
connection with a reorganization. For example, if the plan pays unsecured creditors
only a fraction of their claims, and if the environmental creditor's claim were to be
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V. CONCLUSION
Since 1980, CERCLA has contained a provision that provides for
a direct action against guarantors of insolvent PRPs. Through
amendments to this provision, Congress has made clear its intent to
include insurers in the class of potential guarantors.
To date, an entity has attempted to proceed under CERCLA
against the insurer of an insolvent PRP in only one reported decision.
This attempt failed because the court concluded that the vitality of
CERCLA's direct action provision depends on the issuance of regulations
specifying acceptable financial assurances and that these regulations had
not been promulgated. Consequently, the discussion of direct actions
against insurers, like the discussion of Mirage Plating in Section I of this
Article, appears doomed to remain hypothetical at least until financial
assurance regulations are promulgated.
Entities with existing claims against insolvent PRPs consider a
certain issue to be pressing -- clarification of whether they may pursue
their claims in direct actions against insurers who issued policies to PRPs
prior to the passage of CERCLA. An amendment addressing this issue
would increase the ability of parties to recover response costs incurred
due to the liabilities of insolvent PRPs. An amendment also would
further CERCLA's broad goal of making those who benefited from the
past improper disposal of hazardous waste pay for it"°7 by making
insurers, who undertook the risk of their insured's pollution, responsible
along with their insureds for paying for the cleanup of that pollution.
estimated for allowance purposes, the creditor might consider taking an assignment of
the debtor's policy in order to pursue a larger recovery on its own.
107. See United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985) ("In enacting
CERCLA in 1980, Congress sought to provide the federal government immediately
with tools necessary for prompt and effective response to the nationwide threat posed
by hazardous waste disposal and to impose the costs and responsibility for remedial
action upon the persons responsible for the creation of the hazardous waste threat.").
